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Abstract
This paper makes a theoretical and an empirical contribution to the debate on what
caused the global imbalances. On the empirical side, I provide di¤erent types of evi-
dence to support that housing demand shocks (shocks to the aggregate marginal rate of
substitution between housing and tradables) help to explain the global imbalances. On
the theory side, I show that shocks to the demand for housing generate trade decits
without need for the standard ingredients used by others to model housing (wealth ef-
fects or trade in capital goods). I model housing as a durable and nontradable good.
Countries import tradable goods during periods when more domestic labor is devoted to
produce nontradables to smooth consumption between tradables and nontradables. Hous-
ing booms are larger if the country can run a trade decit because the decit lowers the
opportunity cost of building, which is the foregone consumption of tradable goods due
to reallocation of labor to the construction sector. Concerning the empirical evidence, I
rst document that over the last decade there has been a strong cross-country correlation
between housing variables and current account dynamics. Second, I show that using the
cross-country dynamics of employment in construction as the explanatory variable, the
model generates current account dynamics matching recent global imbalances. Finally, I
use sign restrictions implied by the model to estimate a vector autoregression and identify
the e¤ects of housing demand shocks on the U.S. trade decit. The results suggest that
housing shocks matter for current account dynamics.
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1 Introduction
What explains recent current account dynamics? This question has attracted a lot of
attention because in the decade previous to the recent nancial crisis, the U.S. and some
other developed economies run large and persistent current account decits, often referred to
as global imbalances. This paper makes a theoretical and an empirical contribution to the
debate. On the empirical side, I provide di¤erent types of evidence to support that housing
demand shocks (shocks to the aggregate marginal rate of substitution between housing and
tradables) help to explain the global imbalances. On the theory side, I show that shocks to
the demand for housing generate trade decits without need for the standard ingredients used
by others to model housing (wealth e¤ects or trade in capital goods). I model housing as a
durable and nontradable good. Countries import tradable goods during periods when more
domestic labor is devoted to produce nontradables to smooth consumption between tradables
and nontradables. Housing booms are larger if the country can run a trade decit because the
decit lowers the opportunity cost of building, which is the foregone consumption of tradable
goods due to reallocation of labor to the construction sector.
Housing demand shocks are an unexplored explanation for the global imbalances that is
appealing for three reasons1. First, as I document in Section 2, there are large cross country
di¤erences in housing dynamics and these di¤erences strongly correlate with current account
dynamics (especially for housing quantities, such as labor share in construction or value added
by this sector). Alternative theories of the global imbalances have problems explaining the sub-
stantial heterogeneity in the current account dynamics of developed and emerging economies2.
Second, a large part of the current account decits were nanced through sales of mortgage
related products (Shin 2008 discusses the U.S. case, The Telegraph 2008 the Spanish case).
It is unclear why, in the absence of shocks increasing the demand for funds from the housing
sector, foreigners should express such a strong preference for mortgage products, especially
when in most countries they contained low quality subprime assets not backed up by public
guarantees. Finally, housing shocks may have important aggregate implications because the
1To my knowledge only Matsuyama (1990), Punzi (2008) and Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009) have related
housing and current account dynamics. Matsuyama (1990) is a theoretical study of the current account conse-
quences of income e¤ects on residential investment. Punzi (2008) is a two country version of Iacoviello (2005)
model of housing wealth e¤ects. Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009) document a strong positive association between
current account decits and the appreciation of real estate prices.
2For example, theories based on di¤erences in nancial development or in income growth face the problem
that several countries similar across these dimensions had very di¤erent current account patterns (Eichengreen
2006, Gruber and Kamin 2009, Roubini 2006). Models focused on U.S.-specic factors cannot explain why large
and persistent decits have not being a U.S. specic pattern, i.e., several other developed economies have had
a similar persistent downward trend, with decits reaching similar levels of GDP.
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housing sector is large. For example, in the U.S. from 2001 to 2006, the housing contribution
to total employment was at least 28% from residential construction and at least 41% when
mortgage nance, real estate agents, construction materials etc. are included (The Economist
2005; Roubini 2006b).
In this paper I take housing demand shocks as exogenous. Several papers discuss the
need for housing demand shocks to understand the cross country heterogeneity in housing
dynamics3. Other papers provide candidates for a housing demand shock: bubbles, demographic
changes, innovation in mortgage markets, loosened lending standards, public policies to increase
homeownership rates or preference changes between single and multi-unit houses. In this paper
I do not try to separate these hypotheses4.
The two standard ways to connect housing and the trade balance are trade on investment
goods (trade decits generated by investment booms), and aggregate wealth e¤ects of housing
on consumption. The model that I present does not have aggregate wealth e¤ects, nor cap-
ital goods. Instead, it focuses on consumption smoothing across goods. These features are
appealing for two reasons. First, there is a lack of consensus on the magnitude and sign of
aggregate housing wealth e¤ects (see, for discussion, Buiter 2008, Muellbauer 2007 and Kiy-
otaki et al. 2007; Congressional Budget O¢ ce 2007 surveys recent U.S. studies). Second, in
the U.S. net imports of capital goods account for a smaller fraction of the decit dynamics
than do net imports of consumption goods. Net imports of consumer goods are twice the net
imports of capital goods and their downward trend has accelerated since the mid 1990s. This
fact suggests that consumption smoothing may be a more important driving force of trade
decits that capital dynamics. Moreover, most of the capital employed to build houses is not
tradable. Burstein et al. (2004) report that the share of construction gross output attributable
to tradable materials was at most 24% in France in 1995, 19% in the U.K. in 1998 and 31% in
the U.S. in 1997.
I setup a simple model to illustrate why consumption smoothing across goods and the op-
portunity costs associated with building are enough to generate trade decits after a housing
shock. There are two goods in the model, houses and tradable goods. Houses are nontradable
3Mayer and Hubbard (2008) discuss that economic growth and interest rates alone cannot explain recent
housing dynamics. For example, several countries with low interest on mortgages did not see much house price
appreciation, and others saw house prices and construction continually rising, even as real mortgage rates were
increasing. DSGE models of housing attribute a signicative part of the recent housing dynamics to domestic
preference shocks (Aspachs-Bracons and Rabanal 2009; Iacoviello and Neri 2010).
4As additional evidence, Doms and Krainer (2007) examine data from American Housing Surveys between
1997 and 2005 and report a substantial increase in the share of household income devoted to housing and the
propensity for households to own their homes. They nd that these results hold true across all income quintiles,
ages and education levels. They do not depend on market location; that is, the higher expenditures do not
simply reect higher house prices, but a general increase in the demand for housing.
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and durable. Each country has a xed supply of labor that can allocate to produce either
tradable goods or new houses. The tradable good is identical for both countries, thus there
is only intertemporal trade. I assume exogenous shifts of the aggregate preferences towards
housing. These shifts increase the demand for housing relative to other goods. To increase
the quantity consumed the economy has to move labor from producing tradable goods to con-
structing houses. This labor reallocation implies the opportunity cost of building new houses,
which is the foregone production of tradable goods. Trade decits lower this cost because they
decouple consumption from production. By importing consumer tradables the economy can
reduce its production of tradables while still consuming them. Thus trade decits allow for
smooth consumption across goods while building more at a faster pace. Hence housing booms
are larger when the economy can run a trade decit.
I provide two types of evidence to support that housing demand shocks help to explain
recent global imbalances. First, in a parameterized version of the model, housing shocks that
match the observed cross-country dynamics of housing quantity variables generate current ac-
count dynamics matching recent global imbalances. That is, using the housing variables as
explanatory variables, the model predicts global imbalances similar to those observed in the
data.
Second, the model provides three identication restrictions for a housing demand shock:
conditional on a positive shock, the correlation between the shock, interest rates and residen-
tial investment is positive. Moreover, the conditional correlation of the shock with tradable
consumption is negative. These sign restrictions di¤er from those implied by alternative global
imbalances explanations, for example the savings glut hypothesis predicts decreases in in-
terest rates (Caballero et al. 2008), while technology shocks predict positive comovement of
housing and tradable consumption (Aspachs and Rabanal 2008). I use these sign restrictions
to estimate a vector autoregression and identify the e¤ects of housing shocks on the U.S. trade
decit. The results suggest that housing shocks matter for current account dynamics.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 documents some facts on housing and current
account dynamics. Section 3 describes the model. In Section 4, to illustrate the essence of
the mechanism I rst characterize the equilibrium of a two period model with full housing
depreciation, and then I parameterize the model of Section 3 and perform impulse response
analysis. Section 5 shows how the model can account for recent patterns of global imbalances.
In Section 6, I estimate a vector autoregression using the sign restrictions implied by the model.
Section 7 concludes.
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2 Motivating facts
In this section I present four types of evidence motivating my model. First, over the
period of the global imbalances there has been substantial heterogeneity in the current account
dynamics of developed economies with several countries running large and persistent decits.
Second, over this period there is a strong negative cross-country correlation between housing
and current account dynamics. Third, net imports of consumer goods are twice the net imports
of capital goods and their downward trend has accelerated since the mid 1990s. Fourth, around
the mid 90s housing variables decoupled from the business cycle, while total consumption
expenditure and durable consumption expenditure did not.
2.1 Two facts about current account dynamics
First, large and persistent decits are not a U.S. specic pattern, as Figure 1 illustrates.
Several other developed economies have had a persistent downward trend similar to that of the
United States, with decits reaching similar levels of GDP.
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Fig. 1. Ratio of current account to GDP for Australia, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and
the U.S.
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Second, there has been substantial heterogeneity in the current account dynamics of de-
veloped economies. Table 1 reports this: while the countries on the left panel moved into
surpluses, those in the right panel moved into decits. The heterogeneity within Europe is
especially interesting, because the European Union as a whole had a nearly balanced current
account5.
Table 1: Current account as % of GDP
Rising surpluses Growing decits
1994 2006 1994 2006
Austria -1.47 1.9 Australia -4.9 -5.49
Germany -1.41 4 France 0.54 -2.59
Japan 2.75 3.9 Ireland 2.69 -1.04
Korea -0.95 1.6 Italy 1.18 -2.07
Netherlands 4.75 9.52 Spain -1.23 -8.86
Switzerland 6.22 13.5 Portugal -2.31 -9.58
Canada -2.3 3.34 UK -0.99 -2.45
Sweden 1.13 6.7 USA -1.71 -7.24
2.2 Housing and current account dynamics
Global imbalances grew almost monotonically from the mid 1990s to the mid 2000s. OECD
data show a strong negative cross-country correlation between housing and current account
dynamics over this period. The correlations are particularly strong for variables related to the
quantity of housing, such as the share of labor employed in construction or the value added
by this sector, and are weaker for price variables, such as the real price of housing. Figure 2
illustrates these facts for a sample of seventeen OECD countries between 1994 and 2006. Given
the trend behavior of the time series, I concentrate on the changes between these two dates.
This provides a good idea of the size of the changes.
The three panels of Figure 2 plot on the vertical axis the change in percentage points in the
5There is also a puzzling pattern among emerging economies (IMF 2008). Most of Emerging Asia moved into
current account surpluses while emerging Europe moved into current account decits. In this paper I only used
data from the OECD. Anecdotal evidence suggests that emerging markets also followed the patterns reported
in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Percentage changes in labor share in construction, in value added by construction,
and in real housing prices versus the percentage-points change in the ratio of the CA to GDP
current account to GDP ratio. The top, middle and bottom panels plot respectively on
the horizontal axis the percentage change in the labor share in construction, the percentage
change in the share of value added by the construction sector and the percentage change in
an index of real housing prices. Countries that experienced housing booms also had larger
current account decits. The scatterplots also show substantial heterogeneity in the behavior
of housing markets among OECD countries. The model in this paper uses this heterogeneity
to explain the di¤erences in current account balances reported in Table 1.
2.3 The importance of consumption goods in the U.S. trade decit
Net imports of capital goods account for a smaller fraction of the decit dynamics than
do net imports of consumption goods. This is shown in Figure 3, which decomposes the time
series for the U.S. trade balance in goods in di¤erent groups: autos, capital goods, consumption
goods and energy. Net imports of consumer goods are twice the net imports of capital goods and
their downward trend has accelerated since the mid 1990s. This fact suggests that consumption
smoothing may be a more important driving force of trade decits than capital dynamics.
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Fig. 3. Decomposition of the U.S. trade balance in goods by type of good
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2.4 Housing decoupled from the cycle
Housing variables are highly cyclical, but during the last decade they have been relatively
decoupled from the business cycle in the U.S. and other OECD countries. Figure 4 illustrates
this fact for the U.S. It compares the time series for the ratio of residential investment to GDP,
with the business cycle dened as the deviation from a Hodrick-Prescott trend. The turning
points of both series roughly coincided from 1970 to the mid-1990s, but then housing dynamics
fell strikingly out of step with the business cycle until the mid-2000s. Girouard et al. (2006)
report similar evidence for the OECD.
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Fig. 4. Ratio of residential investment to GDP versus the real GDP cycle (HP ltered with lambda
1600). U.S. quarterly data.
Table 2 reports the cross correlations with GDP at di¤erent annual lags for residential
investment, total consumption expenditure and durable consumption expenditure. Durable
consumption expenditure and residential investment historically had similar cycles as they have
similar sensitivity to interest rates (Erceg and Levin 2006, Leamer 2007). Until the mid-1990s
all three series were strongly correlated with the business cycle. But then GDPs correlation
with residential investment decreased dramatically. This did not happen for total consumption
expenditure or for durable consumption expenditure. Housing decoupled from the business
cycle while expenditures in total and durable consumption did not. I interpret this decoupling
9
as evidence of housing specic shocks since popular sources of economic uctuations, such as
technology, oil, money, scal and aggregate demand cannot account for it.
Table 2: Cross Correlation with output at different lags
1970-1995
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Residential investment -.13 .39 .81 .82 .22 -.26 -.55
Consumption -.21 .24 .73 .95 .58 .13 -.26
Consumer durables .1 .53 .84 .84 .31 -.21 -.53
1995-2006
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Residential investment -.42 .06 .23 .18 -.11 -.3 -.16
Consumption -.82 -.51 .21 .77 .86 .63 .14
Consumer durables -.81 -.29 .4 .68 .65 .48 .08
Note. U.S. annual data. Real variables ltered with the Hodrick Prescott lter, lambda=400
3 The Model
In this section I describe a simple model that is consistent with the previous facts: increases
in the demand for housing will imply trade decits through net imports of consumption goods
to smooth consumption.
3.1 Technology and preferences
There are two countries with the same preferences and technologies. Labor (n) is the
only production input, it can be used to produce new houses (yh) or tradable goods (yc) : The
tradable good is identical for both countries, hence there is only intertemporal trade. The
production functions in country i are
yiht = An

iht (1)
yict = n

ict (2)
where  2 (0; 1).
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Houses (h) are durable and nontradable. They give a ow of housing services proportional
to the stock. Houses can be consumed in the same period as they are built (in the next section
I will calibrate the model to a ve year period). The stock of houses depreciate geometrically
at rate h 2 (0; 1), and its law of motion is
hit = (1  h)hit 1 + yiht (3)
Labor is mobile between both sectors with no adjustment costs, but it cannot move between
countries. Feasibility implies that world production of tradable goods must equal world con-
sumption of tradable goods. Moreover, labor allocated to each sector must sum to the total
labor endowment (ni). The resource constraints areX
i
cit =
X
i
yict (4)
niht + nict = ni (5)
There is an innitely lived representative household in each country who enjoys consumption
of housing and tradable goods without any home bias. They supply labor inelastically in their
home country. The representative household in country i maximizes utility over consumption
of housing services (hit) and tradable goods (cit)
1X
t=0
tu (cit; hit) (6)
I assume the standard constant relative risk aversion functional form over a constant elas-
ticity of substitution aggregator of housing services and tradable consumption
u (cit; hit) =

((1  it)c
" 1
"
it + ith
" 1
"
it )
"
" 1
1  1

1  1

(7)
where  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (IES) as well as the inverse of the coe¢ -
cient of relative risk aversion, " is the static or intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
housing and tradable consumption (SES), and it 2 (0; 1) is a country-specic parameter that
controls the share of consumption of housing services in total expenditure.
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3.2 Equilibrium
Since there are no distortions, the set of competitive equilibria can be traced out by solving
for the Pareto optima. Thus, a competitive equilibrium is the solution to the problem of a world
planner who maximizes the weighted utility of both countries
1X
t=0
X
i
i
tu (cit; hit)
subject to equations (1)  (5) for country weights i: I focus on the equilibrium associated with
1 = 2 = 1: These weights give the same allocations that arise in a competitive equilibrium in
which the representative household in country i has no initial debts, owns the initial stocks of
houses in country i; and all the labor income in country i.
If we denote by 'it the Lagrange Multiplier associated with (3) ; the FOCs of the problem
are
uc (c1t; h1t) = uc (c2t; h2t) (8)
'it = uh (cit; hit) + (1  h)'it+1 i = 1; 2 (9)
'it
yiht
niht
= uc(cit; hit)
yict
nict
i = 1; 2 (10)
Equation (8) implies that both countries must value equally one extra unit of the tradable
good in equilibrium. Equation (9) captures that the marginal utility of the durable good
expands over several periods. Finally, equation (10) says that at any interior equilibrium each
country must be indi¤erent between allocating labor to one sector or to the other, i.e. the
marginal utility of housing multiplied by the labor productivity in that sector must equal the
marginal utility of tradable consumption multiplied by the labor productivity in the tradable
sector.
4 Increases in Housing Demand and Trade Decits
This section studies the e¤ects of transitory shocks that increase the preference for housing
relative to tradable goods. I rst characterize the equilibrium of a two period model with
full housing depreciation. This exercise illustrates the key ingredients of the mechanism: the
nontradability of housing and a low intratemporal elasticity of substitution between housing and
tradable consumption. To consume more houses, the country must build them, hence reducing
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production of tradable goods and creating trade decits to smooth consumption across goods.
I conrm these results by solving numerically a parameterized version of the model of Section
3 and performing impulse response analysis.
4.1 A two period model with no durable good
In this subsection I consider a two period version of the model with full housing depreci-
ation, h = 1: When N1N2 is very small we can think of country 1 as a small open economy, i.e.
shocks in country 1 have no e¤ect on the world interest rate (R) : For the rest of the subsec-
tion I focus on country 1 hence I drop the notation i: I will compare the di¤erences between
the equilibrium in a closed economy and that in a small open economy after an unanticipated
change in the share of housing in the rst period utility (1). In the closed economy the interest
rate is endogenous while in the small open economy it is exogenous.
Also, to reduce notation I assume that the household in country 1 is both the producer and
the consumer. Thus, in the competitive equilibrium she maximizes
U(c1; h1; c2; h2)  u(c1; h1) + u (c2; h2) (11)
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint in terms of tradable goods
c1 +
c2
R
= yc1 +
yc2
R
(12)
and to equations (1) ; (2) ; (5) and
ht = yht for t = 1; 2 (13)
The FOCs are the Euler equation and the equalization of the marginal rate of substitution with
the marginal rate of transformation
uc(c1; h1) = Ruc(c2; h2) (14)
uh(ct; ht)
yht
nht
= uc(ct; ht)
yct
nct
for t = 1; 2 (15)
In a closed economy there is not an option to transfer tradable consumption across periods,
so production and consumption of tradable goods must be equal in every period
ct = yct for t = 1; 2 (16)
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The equilibrium of the closed economy in period 1 is characterized by
uh(yc1; yh1)
uc(yc1; yh1)
=
nh1
yh1
yc1
nc1
(17)
The upper left panel of Figure 5 graphs this condition. The left hand side of equation (17) is
the slope of the indi¤erence curve, which, at the initial equilibrium point A, is tangent to the
Frontier of Possibilities of Production (FPP), whose slope is the right hand side of equation
(17).
An unexpected increase in 1 decreases the slope of the indi¤erence curves as graphed in the
upper right panel of Figure 5. The household now likes housing more, hence she asks for more
tradable goods per unit of housing. The shift of the indi¤erence curves moves the equilibrium
from point A to point B, where consumption of housing services is higher

~hc1 > h


and
consumption of tradable goods lower (~cc1 < c
). There are two reasons why consumption of
tradable goods is lower. One comes directly from the preference shock; the household now likes
tradable goods relatively less, hence she consumes less of them. The second comes from the
opportunity cost of building, to increase the consumption of housing services the country needs
to move along the FPP, reducing production of tradable goods.
The closed economy is a sequence of static problems. An increase in 1 does not alter second
period variables. The unexpected increase in 1 moves the closed economy equilibrium from
point A to point B, but cc2 remains at steady state value c
: I am interested in the case when
the marginal utility of tradable consumption in the rst period increases after the increase in
1, i.e., when even if the preference shock makes tradable goods less appetizing, their marginal
value in period 1 increases because the household likes to smooth consumption across goods.
In this case the preference shock would increase the autarky interest rate, which from equation
(14) can be dened as
Raut  uc(~c
c
1;
~hc1)
uc(c; h)
(18)
This is what the lower right panel of Figure 5 plots. The preference shock increases the marginal
utility of a tradable good in period 1. To ensure that the closed economy does not transfer
tradable goods across periods the interest rate, which is the slope of the intertemporal budget
constraint, increases.
For preferences (7) the marginal utility of tradable consumption in the rst period is
uc(c1; h1) = (1  1)C
1
"
  1

1 c
 1
"
1 (19)
C1  ((1  1)c
" 1
"
1 + 1h
" 1
"
1 )
"
" 1 (20)
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When the SES (") equals the IES () preferences are separable and uc(c1; h1) only depends
on the SES. The lower the SES, the less willing the household is to substitute housing and
tradable consumption within the period. As plotted in the upper right panel of Figure 5, the
unexpected increase in 1 increases h1 and decreases c1: This result holds for any parameter
value consistent with the concavity of the FPP and the convexity of the indi¤erence curves.
The more concave the FPP, the higher the drop in c1; since more resources need to reallocate
to produce an extra unit of housing. In addition, the lower the SES, the more likely that
the decrease in c1 increases uc(c1; h1) and autarky interest rates. Low SES households dislike
unbalanced consumption across goods, thus an extra unit of tradable good is valued more when
building houses is forcing the economy to reduce production and consumption of tradables.
When preferences are not separable (" 6= ), equation (19) shows that there may be a trade-
o¤ between intertemporal and intratemporal smoothing. Smoothing across goods may imply
unbalanced consumption across periods, something disliked by agents with low IES. Depending
on the value of the parameters it may happen that the increase in 1 decreases the marginal
utility of tradable consumption. From now on I will assume that the parameters satisfy the
conditions for uc(~cc1; ~h
c
1) to increase as 1 increases.
Fig. 5. The two period model with no durable good: the closed economy
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If in the small open economy, or in a two country model, an increase in 1 does not increase
interest rates to the new autarky level then the country will borrow and run a trade decit. The
trade decit allows better consumption smoothing across goods in the open economy. Figure
6 depicts this case. The increase in 1 shifts the marginal rate of substitution as in the closed
economy, but for the small economy the interest rate is exogenous and does not change. The
slope of the intertemporal budget constraint remains the same, although the budget constraint
shifts because both Yc1 and Yc2 will change. Now the economy does not have to move to point
B, where consumption equals production. The small economy can instead consume at the
point C while producing at the point D of the upper right panel of Figure 6 if it respects its
intertemporal budget constraint (12), FOC (15) only requests that the slope of the indi¤erence
curve is the same at both points. Point C was not available for the closed economy because
implies a transfer of tradable goods across periods. Interest rates raised to prevented this.
Fig. 6. The two period model with no durable good: the small open economy
16
4.2 Impulse responses in the full model
The full model of section 3 does not have a closed form solution. In this subsection I show
that for reasonable parameterizations increases in the demand for housing generates trade
decits through net imports of consumption goods to smooth consumption.
I calibrate a world with two symmetric countries (i = 1; 2) that face di¤erent housing shocks:
If both countries face shocks of the same size, they are like closed economies. I assume that
both countries have the same population size. This allows me to study how domestic shocks
a¤ect the trade partners. The length of a period in the model is ve years. There are two sets
of parameters to choose:
1. Preference parameters: I assume the value for risk aversion standard in the real
business cycle literature, 1

= 2. Concerning the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
housing and tradable goods (") some papers have estimated a related concept, the elasticity of
substitution between housing and nonhousing consumption. For example Davido¤ and Yoshida
(2008) obtain estimates ranging from 0.4 to 0.9 and Kahn (2008) provides evidence based on
both aggregate and microeconomic data that is less than one. Tesar (1993) estimates the
elasticity between traded and nontraded goods to be 0.44. I use " = 0:9: For the unconditional
mean of the share of housing in the economy I set i = 0:2: This number is consistent with
recent data on the weight of the housing sector in the U.S. economy (The Economist 2005,
Roubini 2006b).
2. Technology parameters: I assume the same labor share across sectors and set it to
the standard  = 0:67. I choose the discount factor to match a steady state interest rate of
10%: For the depreciation of the stock of houses I use the ve year equivalent of 2% annual
depreciation, h = 0:1; which is consistent with the BEA (2004) report that annual depreciation
rates for one-to-four-unit residential structures are between 1.1% and 3.6%. Concerning the
scale parameters I normalize n to 1 so nh is the labor share in construction. I set A to be 1=30,
which gives a construction labor share of 14% in a steady state with zero trade balance.
To illustrate the mechanics of the model, in period zero I give an unanticipated housing
preference shock to country 1 that increases 1 from its unconditional mean  to 1 = 0:5. If
country 2 had a shock of the same size then both countries would behave exactly as if they
were closed economies.
After a housing preference shock, the country wants to consume more housing services. Since
these are not tradable, the country needs to build more houses. This implies reallocating labor to
the construction sector and sacricing production of tradable goods. This happens both in the
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open and in the closed economy. The open economy can decouple consumption decisions from
production decisions because it can import tradables for consumption. But the closed economy
cannot. In the closed economy, building more houses requires reducing tradable consumption.
This is an implicit adjustment cost, because housing services and tradable consumption are
complements the household wants to smooth consumption across goods. The open and closed
economies react di¤erently to the same housing shock. Both reduce tradable consumption and
reallocate labor towards construction. But the open economy runs a trade decit importing
tradables for consumption. This enables a smaller reduction in tradable consumption and
increased consumption of housing services. These dynamics are shown in Figure 7.
Two prices govern the competitive equilibrium of this economy: i) the relative price of
housing services in terms of consumer tradables; ii) the real interest rate, the price of one unit
of the tradable good today in terms of tradable goods tomorrow. The housing shock implies an
increase in the demand for housing. This translates into higher housing prices and construction.
But although the shock reduces preferences for tradable goods, tradables are valuable because
they allow smoothing of foregone consumption due to reallocation of labor to housing. The
increase in intertemporal demand requires interest rates to rise. In an open economy, interest
rates jump less than in a closed economy because country 2, by nancing a trade decit, helps
to satisfy demand for tradables in country 1.
The model is a representative agent model and housing is not tradable. There are no wealth
e¤ects from a housing shock. But this does not preclude the housing boom from causing a trade
decit. Trade decits and housing reactions are quantitatively large in the model. This happens
because there are no frictions and because markets are complete. Finally, the dynamics are
short-lived, because the absence of frictions allows the economy to reallocate resources quickly.
In a couple of periods it has built the desired housing stock.
4.3 Summarizing the implications of the model
To sum up, the models predictions after a housing shock are as follows:
First, trade decits arise in periods of housing boom. The next section builds on this
prediction to show that the model, using housing variables as explanatory variables, generate
current account dynamics that match the recent global imbalances.
Second, housing booms are larger in open economies that can run trade decits. This pre-
diction is conrmed by recent housing dynamics in the OECD. Girouard et al. (2006) document
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more generalized housing upswings across OECD countries in recent years than in the past.
These upswings coincided with the OECD opening to trade with non-OECD economies and
starting to run an aggregate trade decit.
Third, conditional on a shock that raises the demand for housing the correlation between
the shock, interest rates and residential investment is positive. This conditional correlation is
negative with tradable consumption. In Section 6, I use these sign restrictions to estimate a
vector autoregression and identify the e¤ects of housing specic shocks on the U.S. trade decit.
5 The Model and The Global Imbalances
I now consider if the model can rationalize recent global imbalances. I show that it can
account for Figure 2 using the housing variables as explanatory variables.
I perform the following experiment with the parameterized model of Section 4.2. I assume
that country 1 experiences a housing shock while country 2 does not. I simulate a series of
positive shocks in country 1 and obtain the reaction in both countries of the labor share in
construction, the production of new houses and the trade balance from the steady state to the
peak of the housing boom. For the current parameterization this happens in the rst period,
i.e. in ve years, because in the absence of frictions the country can build very quickly. To label
the countries of Figure 2 as country 1 or country 2 I assume that positive housing movements
in Figure 2 come from country 1. Negative movements come from country 2. This introduces
a kink at zero in my simulation because, except for the trade balance, countries 1 and 2 do not
react symmetrically to a country 1 shock, as shown in the lower right panel of Figure 6. The
asymmetry arises because labor is nontradable. Country 1 adjusts via two channels after the
shock: it reallocates resources between its two sectors, and it runs a trade decit, which implies
resource reallocation in country 2. These two channels are not symmetric because labor can
only be reallocated domestically.
Figure 8 plots the results of my simulation. The top panel graphs the global imbalances
predicted by the model for a series of shocks that trace out the observed movements in the labor
share employed in construction between 1994 and 2006, as displayed on the horizontal axis. The
middle panel follows the same procedure but matches the change in the value added by the
construction sector observed in the data. The third panel matches the observed movements
in the housing prices. In all the simulations, countries with positive housing movements are
considered to be country 1 in the model. For both the value added and the labor share employed
in construction, the model generates current account dynamics very similar to the observed
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global imbalances. I interpret this as support for housing shocks as a driver of current
account dynamics.
6 Sign Restriction Identication
The model in Section 4.2 provides three identication restrictions for a housing demand
shock: conditional on a positive shock, the correlation between the shock, interest rates and
residential investment is positive. Moreover, the conditional correlation of the shock with trad-
able consumption is negative. These sign restrictions di¤er from those implied by alternative
theories proposed to explain the global imbalances, for example the savings glut shocks predict
decreases in interest rates, technology shocks imply comovement of housing and tradable con-
sumption. Standard economic shocks like aggregate demand, scal, money, oil, and technology
shocks also do not imply these reactions. This section exploits these sign restrictions to identify
housing shocks from the forecast errors of a reduced form vector autoregression.
6.1 Methodology
Faust (1998), Canova and De Nicoló (2002) and Uhlig (2005) have proposed di¤erent
ways to impose sign restrictions directly on impulse responses to identify economic shocks in a
structural vector autoregression (SVAR). I will follow Uhlig (2005), using an e¢ cient algorithm
proposed by Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2005) 6. I start by estimating a reduced form VAR on U.S.
data, which contains the four variables central for my identication: real residential investment
(Ih), real tradable consumption (C) ; long term interest rates proxied by the 10 year Treasury
(LTR) and the trade balance/GDP ratio
 
NX
GDP

. I also include the variables commonly used
in the SVAR literature to identify other economic shocks: relative price of equipment (pe), non
farm business labor productivity (z) ; total government scal decit (G),the price level (P ) ;
and the Fed Funds rate (FF ).
I estimate a VAR with four lags that I reformulate into the companion matrix VAR(1) form:
Yt = BYt 1 + ut (21)
where E (utu0t)   and
6See Dedola and Neri (2007) for a recent survey of sign restriction identication and its advantages.
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Yt 
266666666666666664
log pet
log zt
Gt
logPt
FFt
logCt
log Iht
LTRt
NXt
GDPt
377777777777777775
I assume that the forecast errors (ut) and the structural shocks ("t) are related by
ut = A"t (22)
where E ("t"0t) = I: This implies that  = AA
0: The impulse responses to the economic shocks
are
@Yt+j
@"t
= BjA (23)
I want to identify the column of A associated with the housing shock. Without loss of
generality, I assume that the housing shock is the rst entry in "t: Denoting the ith variable in
Yt by Yit: I impose the following sign restrictions
@Y6t+j
@"1t
< 0;
@Y7t+j
@"1t
> 0;
@Y8t+j
@"1t
> 0 (24)
where j is the number of quarters during which I impose the sign restrictions. These sign
restrictions are derived from the model of Section 4 after a shock to the marginal rate of
substitution between housing and tradable consumption. In the model the number of quarters
during which the restrictions hold depends on the calibration. Hence I will compare the results
using di¤erent horizons. I do not impose any restriction on NXt
GDPt
; since this is the variable of
interest.
The matrix A is unique up to an orthonormal transformation, i.e., wherever QQ0 = I
then  = AQQ0A0: I need to search for the set of AQ matrices satisfying (24). I draw 1000
elements of that set.7
7I followed the algorithm of Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2005): without loss of generality, I assume A = chol () ;
then I draw a matrix X; whose cells come from a standard normal distribution. Then I compute the QR
decomposition of X. I normalize the diagonal of R to be positive and check if AQ satises (24) : If it does, I keep
AQ, if not I discard and draw again. I keep drawing until I have 1000 successes.
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6.2 Results
My sample covers the period 1982:q1 to 2006:q4. Bems et al. (2007) provide several argu-
ments for starting in 1982, and I use their series for the price of equipment. They make two
main arguments. First, we want the sample to cover a period when trade was widely liberalized.
Second, we also want to avoid both the structural break in monetary policy associated with
the appointment of Paul Volcker (Clarida et al. 2000) and the structural break in the price of
equipment reported by Fisher (2006).
I estimate the VAR in levels of the logs of the variables (except for the Fed Funds rate,
the ratio Net Exports/GDP and the Net Government Decit, for which I do not take logs).
I do not model cointegration relationships, Sims et al. (1990) have shown that the systems
dynamics can be consistently estimated in a VAR in levels even in the presence of unit roots. I
also include a constant term. I use three proxies for tradable consumption: consumer durables,
consumer nondurables excluding energy related goods, and the sum of the previous two.
Figure 9 reports the range of impulse responses for the ratio Trade Balance/GDP to a
positive housing shock. Sign restrictions are weak identication restrictions in the sense that
they lead to a plurality of candidate structural impulse responses. Figure 9 plots the set of
impulse responses satisfying the restrictions. The rst column has the sign restrictions imposed
for one year, the second for two. The top row uses consumer durables as a proxy for tradable
goods. The middle row uses consumer non-durables excluding gasoline, fuel, oil, and other
energy goods. The bottom row uses consumer durables plus non durables excluding energy
related goods. The results mostly conrm that housing shocks imply a trade decit.
To assess the quantitative importance of housing shocks for net export dynamics, I compute
the percentage of the variance of the trade balance forecasting error that is attributable to a
positive housing shock. Figure 10 contains the results at di¤erent time horizons for the sign
restrictions imposed for four and eight quarters respectively. I report the results for the same
three proxies of consumer tradables. Housing shocks may be important driving forces of current
account dynamics.
Finally, in Figure 11 I use equation (22) to plot the time paths of the housing shocks for
each proxy of tradable consumption and for the sign restrictions imposed for four and eight
quarters, respectively. Two results seem robust to the di¤erent specications: the volatility of
the shocks increased in the early 2000s and there were some large spikes during this period.
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7 Concluding Remarks
This paper makes a theoretical and an empirical contribution to the debate on what caused
the global imbalances. I document that over the last decade there has been a strong cross-
country correlation between housing variables and current account dynamics. I present a simple
model that shows that increases in the demand for nontradables relative to tradables imply trade
decits to smooth consumption between tradables and nontradables. I focus on housing, which
I model as a durable nontradable good. Then I provide two types of evidence that housing
demand shocks, shocks to the aggregate marginal rate of substitution between housing and
tradables, help to explain recent global imbalances. A parameterized version of the model,
for observed cross-section housing movements, generates trade balance dynamics consistent
with recent OECD current account dynamics. Finally, housing demand shocks identied with
model-consistent sign restrictions in a SVAR help to explain the U.S. trade balance.
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Fig. 9. Range of impulse responses for the ratio Trade Balance/GDP to a positive housing shock
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Data sources
The series for current account and gross domestic product in Figures 1 and 2, and Table 1
are from the OECD. The series for labor share and value added from the construction sector
are obtained from Datastream, which collects these data from domestic sources. The real house
prices have been provided by the Bank of International Settlements and are compiled using
national sources.
Figure 4 and Table 2 summarize data series for consumer durables, total consumption,
gross domestic product, and residential investment from the NIPA tables published by the
BEA (http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/index.asp).
The series in Figure 3 for the trade balance in goods and its decomposition come from Table
2a in the U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data published by the BEA.
In Section 6, I used the series described in Bems et al. (2007) together with data on consumer
durables, nondurables and 10 year constant maturity Treasury yields from the FRED database.
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